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Explaining	the	popularity	of	Poland’s	Law	and
Justice	government
Despite	coming	under	heavy	criticism	from	its	political	opponents	for	allegedly	undermining
democracy	and	the	rule	of	law,	the	popularity	of	Poland’s	Law	and	Justice	government	remains	at
record	levels.	Aleks	Szczerbiak	writes	that	the	government	has	delivered	on	its	high-profile	social
spending	pledges,	strongly	opposed	the	EU’s	unpopular	migrant	relocation	scheme,	and	many
Poles	feel	that	it	deserves	credit	for	at	least	trying	to	tackle	the	shortcomings	of	the	Polish	state.
With	the	opposition	failing	to	mount	an	effective	challenge,	the	ruling	party’s	greatest	threat	comes
from	a	risk	of	arrogance	and	complacency	developing	among	its	own	supporters.
Polish	Prime	Minister	Beata	Szydło,	Credit:	©	European	Union	2017	–	European	Parliament	(CC	BY-ND-NC	4.0)
Poland’s	government	–	led,	since	its	autumn	2015	election	victory,	by	the	right-wing	Law	and	Justice	(PiS)	party	–
has	come	under	heavy	fire	from	its	political	opponents.	The	government	has	been	accused	of	creeping
authoritarianism	and	illiberalism,	failing	to	respect	the	Polish	Constitution	and	separation	of	powers,	and
undermining	democracy	and	the	rule	of	law	in	its	approach	to	the	judiciary,	media,	public	appointments	and	civic
rights.	Thousands	of	Poles	have	participated	in	anti-government	protests	and	the	Law	and	Justice	administration
has	faced	harsh	criticism	from	the	EU	political	establishment	and	much	of	the	Western	opinion-forming	media.
The	European	Commission	has	launched	a	‘rule	of	law’	action	under	Article	7	of	the	European	treaties,
threatening	the	Polish	government	with	sanctions	including	possible	suspension	of	the	country’s	voting	rights	in
the	European	Council.
However,	the	government’s	supporters	have	robustly	denied	these	allegations,	defending	its	actions	as
necessary	to	restore	pluralism	and	balance	to	institutions	which,	they	argue,	have	been	expropriated	by
extremely	well-entrenched,	and	often	deeply	corrupt,	post-communist	elites.	Moreover,	in	spite	of	this	wave	of
criticism,	Law	and	Justice	has	maintained	high	levels	of	public	support	and	during	the	last	couple	of	months	the
party’s	popularity	has	reached	record	levels.
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As	the	‘Pooling	the	Poles’	micro-blog	that	aggregates	voting	intention	surveys	shows,	Law	and	Justice	(PiS)	has
a	clear	poll	lead	averaging	43%	support	(in	the	autumn	2015	election	it	secured	37.6%)	compared	with	23%	for
the	centrist	Civic	Platform	(PO),	Poland’s	ruling	party	between	2007	and	2015,	10%	for	the	anti-establishment
‘Kukiz	‘15’	grouping,	and	9%	for	the	liberal	‘Modern’	(Nowoczesna)	party.	An	October	survey	by	the	CBOS	polling
agency	also	found	that	that,	at	44%,	the	number	of	government	supporters	was	at	its	highest	level	since	Law	and
Justice	took	office;	27%	were	opposed	and	26%	neutral.
Chart:	National	polling	trends	for	Polish	parliamentary	parties
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Source:	Chart	produced	by	Pooling	the	Poles	/	Ben	Stanley
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Why	is	the	ruling	party	so	popular?	Perhaps	most	importantly,	the	government	has	delivered	on	several	of	the
high-profile	social	spending	pledges	that	were	the	key	to	its	2015	election	success.	The	most	significant	of	these
were	its	extremely	popular	flagship	‘500	plus’	child	subsidy	programme	for	the	first	children	of	poorer	households
and	every	second	and	subsequent	child	in	all	families,	and	a	law	reversing	the	previous	government’s	deeply
unpopular	pension	reforms,	which	had	increased	the	retirement	age	to	67	(from	60	for	women	and	65	for	men).
The	‘500	plus’	programme	in	particular	has	had	an	important	symbolic	effect	by	providing	a	significant	and	clearly
identifiable	financial	boost	to	many	low	income	households	who	felt	frustrated	that	they	had	not	shared	sufficiently
in	Poland’s	recent	economic	growth.	Many	Poles	feel	that,	while	politicians	have	often	promised	to	help	the	less
well-off,	Law	and	Justice	is	the	first	party	to	actually	deliver	on	these	pledges	on	such	a	scale.
Moreover,	although	the	government’s	social	spending	programmes	are	very	costly,	and	its	opponents	argue	that
they	place	a	massive	strain	on	public	finances,	the	Polish	economy	is	performing	much	better	than	expected.
Economic	growth	is	strong,	investment	increasing,	unemployment	is	at	its	lowest	level	for	25	years,	wages	have
started	to	rise,	and	increased	tax	revenues	have	actually	led	to	a	reduction	in	the	state	budget	deficit.
For	sure,	the	government’s	critics	argue	that	it	is	benefiting	from	a	more	general	upswing	in	the	European
economy	and	a	short-term	consumption	boom	rather	than	increased	productivity	and	private	sector	investment.
The	level	of	public	debt	remains	high	and	increased	social	spending	could,	they	say,	cause	serious	problems	in
the	future	if	there	is	an	economic	downturn	and	the	fiscal	situation	deteriorates.	Nonetheless,	Poles	are	more
optimistic	about	the	state	of	both	the	economy	and	their	personal	finances	than	they	have	been	for	many	years.
Opposing	enforced	multi-culturalism
The	vast	majority	of	Poles	also	support	the	Law	and	Justice	government’s	strong	opposition	to	the	EU’s
mandatory	re-distribution	quotas	for	Middle	Eastern	and	North	African	migrants	located	in	Greece	and	Italy.	For
example,	a	May	2017	CBOS	survey	found	that	70%	of	Poles	were	against	accepting	refugees	(never	mind
economic	migrants)	from	Muslim	countries	and	only	25%	were	in	favour.	Law	and	Justice	understands	that	for
many	Poles	the	European	migration	crisis	is	an	issue	of	huge	political	and	symbolic	importance	and	–	in	stark
contrast	to	the	socially	liberal,	cosmopolitan	consensus	that	predominates	among	West	European	cultural	and
political	elites	–	they	view	the	EU	relocation	scheme	as	a	threat	to	national	sovereignty,	identity	and	security.
Most	Poles	are	keen	to	avoid	the	kind	of	cultural	and	security	problems	that	they	feel	West	European	countries
have	experienced	through	admitting	large	numbers	of	Muslim	migrants	who	are	seen	as	difficult	to	assimilate	and
embedding	violent	extremists	within	their	communities.	The	fact	that,	unlike	in	many	West	European	cities,	there
have	been	no	Islamist	terrorist	attacks	in	Poland	has	increased	Poles’	sense	that	they	live	in	a	relatively	safe
country	and	they	fear	that	EU-imposed	multi-culturalism	threatens	their	security.
Moreover,	although	Poles	are	still	overwhelmingly	pro-EU,	they	are	more	divided	over	whether	the	Union’s
institutions	should	become	involved	in	the	country’s	internal	affairs.	Many	are	sympathetic	to	Law	and	Justice’s
claim	that	the	Commission’s	criticisms	of	the	Polish	government	are	motivated,	in	part	at	least,	by	Warsaw’s
rejection	of	enforced	multi-culturalism	and,	more	broadly,	by	what	they	see	as	a	hegemonic	EU	liberal-left
consensus	in	the	moral-cultural	sphere	that	undermines	Poland’s	traditional	values	and	national	identity.
Interestingly,	a	June	2017	poll	conducted	by	the	IBRiS	agency	for	the	‘Polityka’	journal	found	that	51%	of
respondents	actually	supported	leaving	the	EU	if	this	was	the	only	way	to	prevent	Poland	from	being	forced	to
admit	Muslim	migrants.
A	weak	and	ineffective	opposition
Poland’s	liberal	and	centrist	opposition	has	also	failed	to	mount	an	effective	challenge	to	Law	and	Justice.
Although	many	Poles	have	misgivings	about	the	government’s	approach	to	constitutional	issues	and	civic	rights,
the	strategy	of	so-called	‘total	opposition’,	based	on	exerting	pressure	through	a	combination	of	street	protests
and	international	influence,	has	proved	largely	ineffective.
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The	opposition	has	spent	too	much	time	focusing	on	issues	that	are	too	abstract	for	most	Poles,	while	failing	to
offer	an	attractive	alternative	on	their	more	pressing	social	and	economic	concerns	where	Law	and	Justice	is
clearly	more	in	tune	with	public	opinion.	While	he	is	an	effective	political	operator	who	has	consolidated	his	grip
on	the	Civic	Platform	apparatus,	party	leader	Grzegorz	Schetyna	lacks	dynamism	and	charisma	and	is	constantly
being	undermined	by	younger	deputies	who	were	close	to	the	previous	party	leadership.	At	the	same	time,	a
series	of	gaffes	and	public	relations	disasters	have	allowed	government	supporters	to	portray	‘Modern’	leader
Ryszard	Petru	as	an	over-promoted	political	lightweight.
Moreover,	Law	and	Justice’s	election	victory	also	reflected	widespread	disillusionment	with	the	country’s	ruling
elite	and	a	strong	prevailing	mood	that	it	was	time	for	change,	and	most	Poles	do	not	want	to	see	a	return	to	the
status	quo	as	it	was	prior	to	the	election.	Although	he	was	not	in	the	party’s	inner	circle	for	a	number	of	years
before	becoming	leader,	for	many	voters	Schetyna	is	still	associated	in	the	public	mind	with	the	previous,
discredited	Civic	Platform	administration.	The	government	has	also	made	it	difficult	for	Schetyna’s	party	to
disassociate	itself	from	the	negative	legacies	of	its	earlier	period	in	office.
For	example,	a	special	parliamentary	commission	investigating	the	2012	Amber	Gold	pyramid	scheme	scandal,
as	a	result	of	which	thousands	of	Poles	lost	their	savings,	has	revealed	the	inadequacies	of	the	state’s	oversight
systems	under	Civic	Platform’s	watch.	Similarly,	Warsaw	mayor,	and	one	of	Civic	Platform’s	deputy	leaders,
Hanna	Gronkiewicz-Waltz,	has	also	caused	the	party	embarrassment	by	refusing	to	appear	before	a	special
government-appointed	verification	commission	investigating	the	so-called	‘reprivatisation	scandal’:	irregularities	in
the	return	of	properties	in	the	capital	confiscated	under	communist	rule.
Paradoxically,	although	it	frustrated	a	key	element	of	the	government’s	legislative	programme,	Law	and	Justice-
backed	President	Andrzej	Duda’s	July	vetoes	of	two	controversial	flagship	judicial	reform	bills	may	also	have
helped	the	ruling	party,	in	the	short-term	at	least.	By	taking	the	wind	out	of	the	opposition’s	sails	and	focusing
public	attention	on	debates	within	the	governing	camp,	the	presidential	vetoes	have	both	marginalised,	and
highlighted	the	weakness	and	ineffectiveness	of	the	government’s	opponents.	However,	the	political	ambitions
and	emotions	involved	here	may	be	difficult	to	contain	within	manageable	boundaries	and	there	is	a	danger	that,
if	this	political	conflict	between	the	President	and	ruling	party	escalates	out	of	control,	it	could	lead	to	ongoing
mutual	recriminations	within	–	and	even,	in	the	worst	case	scenario,	the	implosion	of	–	the	governing	camp.
Arrogance	and	complacency	are	the	greatest	risks
Some	commentators	have	argued	that	opinion	polls	may	be	over-estimating	Law	and	Justice’s	support,	or	that
the	party	should	be	performing	even	better	given	the	state	of	the	economy	and	level	of	social	transfers.	However,
the	fact	that	its	polling	surge	has	come	later	in	the	parliamentary	term,	rather	than	as	a	post-election	‘bounce’	that
newly	elected	parties	often	enjoy,	suggests	that	it	is	more	deep-rooted.	Indeed,	even	if	they	disagree	with	some
specific	government	measures,	many	Poles	still	feel	that	Law	and	Justice	deserves	credit	for	at	least	trying	to
tackle	some	of	the	apparently	intractable	problems	with,	and	shortcomings	of,	the	Polish	state	which	had	been
ignored	by	previous	governments.
For	example,	even	many	of	the	government’s	critics	have	praised	its	attempts	to	seek	redress	for	ordinary
citizens	who	lost	out	as	a	result	of	the	Warsaw	reprivatisation	scandal.	Law	and	Justice	has	thus	been	highly
effective	at	convincing	a	large	number	of	Poles	that,	for	all	its	faults,	it	is	at	least	attempting	to	make	the	state
more	responsive	and	citizen-friendly	and	prevent	it	from	being	hijacked	by	well-connected	elites	and	special
interests.	An	important	element	of	this	is	what	some	commentators	have	termed	the	‘redistribution	of	prestige’,
whereby	many	ordinary	Poles	who	previously	felt	themselves	to	be	second-class	citizens	have	started	to	regain	a
sense	of	dignity	and	they	now	feel	that	their	government	is	finally	trying	to	restore	an	elementary	sense	of	justice
and	moral	order.
In	fact,	apart	from	the	risk	of	escalating	conflicts	within	the	governing	camp,	the	greatest	threat	to	Law	and	Justice
probably	comes	from	the	danger	of	its	own	activists	succumbing	to	the	kind	of	arrogance	and	complacency	that
led	to	the	downfall	of	its	predecessors,	especially	if	they	are	seen	increasingly	as	failing	to	live	up	to	the	ethical
standards	of	a	party	that	claims	to	stand	for	the	moral	renewal	of	the	Polish	state.	
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So	far,	the	negative	publicity	surrounding	questionable	appointments	to	state-owned	companies	and	agencies,
the	awarding	of	contracts	to	political	allies,	and	appropriation	of	state	resources	for	partisan	ends,	has	not
damaged	the	ruling	party	to	any	great	extent;	its	supporters	still	regard	these	as	the	occasional	lapses	of	a
generally	honest	party.	However,	experience	suggests	that	an	accumulation	of	apparently	minor	incidents	can
gradually	chip	away	at	a	governing	party’s	credibility	so	that	when	a	more	serious,	high	profile	scandal	emerges	it
can	act	as	a	tipping	point	and	quickly	shift	the	public	mood.	In	spite	of	recent	mishaps,	Law	and	Justice	can	be
grateful	that	it	is	still	some	way	off	reaching	that	tipping	point.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	A	version	of	this	article	appears	at	Aleks	Szczerbiak’s	personal	blog.	The	article	gives	the	views	of
the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.
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